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ABSTRACT
This article explores the dynamics of brokerage at the intersection
between the justice conceptions enshrined in global norms and
the notions of justice asserted in speciﬁc socio-environmental
struggles. Using the case of a small hydropower project in Nepal,
we trace the attempts of an indigenous activist to enrol villagers
in his campaign against the background of villagers’ everyday
negotiations with the hydropower company. The study shows
how global norms, such as indigenous peoples’ rights, may fail to
gain traction on the ground or even become sources of injustice
in particular contexts.
RÉSUMÉ
Cet article explore les négociations et les dynamiques
d’intermédiation qui interviennent à l’intersection des conceptions
de la justice inscrites dans les normes internationales et celles qui
sont revendiquées dans des luttes socio-environnementales
spéciﬁques. À partir du cas d’un petit projet hydroélectrique au
Népal, nous décrivons comment un activiste autochtone a tenté de
convaincre les villageois de se joindre à sa campagne, dans le
contexte de négociations quotidiennes entre les villageois et
l’entreprise hydroélectrique. L’étude montre que les normes
internationales, comme les droits des peuples autochtones, risquent
de ne pas être respectées sur le terrain ou même d’être des
sources d’injustice dans certains contextes.
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Shyam is having a hard time convincing the villagers of Bargachhi to support his campaign
directed at a small hydropower project.1 The local chairman of the Nepal Federation of
Indigenous Nationalities (NEFIN) has a point: the one meeting held by the project devel-
oper with villagers eight years ago does not meet the requirements of the indigenous
peoples’ rights to consultation set out in International Labour Organisation Convention
169 (ILO 169), ratiﬁed by Nepal’s government. Shyam’s problem is that ILO 169 has
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little traction with villagers, not only because few know about the convention but also
because of its focus on procedural rights. Villagers’ attention is on distributive matters:
they request remedial actions for avoidable harms caused by construction, claim compen-
sation for unavoidable damages and want a share in the project’s beneﬁts.
Shyam encounters a more general issue with regard to the linkages between global indi-
genous rights and socio-environmental struggles in speciﬁc sites: the conceptions of justice
enshrined in global norms may be diﬀerent from people’s notions on the ground (Upton
2014; Sikor and Hoang 2016). In Bargachhi, villagers emphasise distributive issues because
to them, justice is about avoiding harm and deriving beneﬁts from the project. Their
demands resonate with Nepal’s regulations on hydropower projects, which stress distribu-
tive concerns over procedural rights. In contrast, NEFIN’s stated agenda highlights indi-
genous peoples’ self-determination and demands collective procedural rights as
operationalised in the Principle of Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) in correspon-
dence with ILO 169 and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples (UNDRIP). Shyam ﬁnds himself caught in the middle: between the distributive
conceptions dominant on the ground and in national policy, on the one hand, and the
emphasis on recognition (that is acknowledging indigenous peoples’ distinct identities
and histories and eliminating any forms of cultural domination) in mobilisations and
global norms on indigenous peoples’ rights, on the other (Doran 2017)). He faces the
problem pointed out by Merry (2006a) with regard to the promotion of global human
rights: “[l]ocal communities often conceive of social justice in quite diﬀerent terms
from human rights activists” (1).
Discrepancies between global and local notions of justice may be a common feature of
socio-environmental struggles around the world (Martin et al. 2014). Contestations in par-
ticular sites are able to invoke a rapidly expanding set of global norms, including those
highlighting environmental concerns and others seeking to protect particular marginalised
groups such as indigenous peoples. Similarly, where marginalised people have successfully
mobilised against powerful companies or state agencies, they have been found to do so by
crafting temporary alliances with activists and supporters at national and global levels
(Sneddon and Fox 2008; Bickerstaﬀ and Agyeman 2009). Such alliances require the
involved activists to create overlaps in multiple problem framings, such as shared
beliefs, ideas about collective action and strategies (Tarrow 1998). Part of these framings
are ideas about justice, we suggest. Aﬀected people and activists explicitly invoke or
implicitly operate on the basis of particular notions of what justice means in speciﬁc con-
texts (Upton 2014; Sikor and Hoang 2016). Consequently, negotiations over notions of
justice are a critical component in alliances between people and activists.
Intermediaries of various sorts, such as environmental activists, community leaders and
the staﬀ of nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), play a key role as builders of these
temporary alliances. They may be rooted at the local level, engaging simultaneously in
national and transnational mobilisations. Or they may focus on building transnational lin-
kages and coalitions, yet retain some involvement in local and national struggles (Della
Porta and Tarrow 2005; Caouette 2007). Given a certain charisma, intermediaries may
help to form global justice networks (Routledge, Nativel, and Cumbers 2006). They
may also help redeﬁne and adapt global ideas to a particular historical and cultural
context through the process of “vernacularisation” (connecting and creating meaning in
a variety of ways) (Merry and Levitt 2017; Goldstein 2015). They also play critical roles
2 T. SIKOR ET AL.
on the ground, as observed in the struggle against a mining company in India (Kumar
2014) and the resistance against unequal exposure to industrial pollution in England
(Bickerstaﬀ and Agyeman 2009).
The intermediaries’ role resembles the work performed by brokers in development
(Olivier de Sardan 2005). Brokers help to bring together actors operating in diﬀerent
spheres, forging relationships across existing divides and generating shared framings of
the problem. Brokerage helps constitute global norms, policies and projects (Mosse and
Lewis 2006) by translating norms into the languages of diverse actors, recruiting suppor-
ters (Mosse 2005) and aligning actors’ interests with global arrangements.
Drawing on these literatures, this article explores brokerage at the intersection of global
indigenous rights and socio-environmental struggles in speciﬁc sites and facilitating cross-
scale alliances. We examine site-speciﬁc and global notions of justice and how brokers
mediate between them when ideas about justice conﬂict. Thus, we contribute to a better
understanding of how brokerage refashions global rights agendas for local contexts and
reframes local grievances in terms of global rights principles and activities (Merry 2006b, 39).
Our case is a small hydropower project in western Nepal. In particular we examine a
speciﬁc intermediary, Shyam. This bottom-up microscopic approach admittedly neglects
important elements such as the role of national movements and struggles among global
activists, yet it promises unique theoretical insights on the dynamics of brokerage in
speciﬁc contexts.
Our data were collected through a variety of methods: a household survey; semi-struc-
tured interviews; key informant interviews; and a review of documents. The survey used
questionnaires with 37 households, selected out of a total of 179 through stratiﬁed
random sampling, to describe their livelihoods and experienced project impacts. Nine
semi-structured interviews helped us understand how diﬀerent kinds of villagers (from
a wide range of socio-economic backgrounds – class, caste, ethnicity and gender – and
engaged in diﬀerent relations with the project) evaluate project impacts, the actions under-
taken by the company to address the impacts and NEFIN’s demands. The analysis also
draws on follow-up expert interviews and the co-authors’ longstanding familiarity with
Nepal and the study area.
We begin with a short review of hydropower politics, ethnic mobilisations and local
politics in Nepal. Following a brief introduction to the study site, we analyse everyday
negotiations over project impacts and beneﬁts to demonstrate how villagers and
company institutionalised a particular, distributive notion of justice in line with Nepal’s
hydropower policy. This sets the scene for our analysis of Shyam’s attempts to relate vil-
lagers’ concerns to NEFIN’s agenda, which emphasised the recognition of indigenous
peoples’ collective identities over distributive concerns. We conclude with a discussion
of brokerage, its mediating eﬀects on the inﬂuence of global norms in speciﬁc socio-
environmental struggles and the particular challenges faced by indigenous peoples’
activists.
The politics of hydropower and ethnicity in Nepal
Democratisation has had profound eﬀects on Nepal’s hydropower sector over the past two
decades and a half. The new space available for public debate about the role of hydropower
in development has shaped hydropower policy and politics in a narrow sense. Ethnic
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mobilisations and the associated politics of indigeneity have inﬂuenced the exercise of
state authority over natural resources, including hydropower development. Democratisa-
tion thereby has facilitated the emergence of diﬀerent politics of justice, one centred on the
equitable distribution of hydropower beneﬁts and the other focusing on the recognition of
indigenous nationalities’ self-determination.
Hydropower policy and politics
Nepal’s development planners have long pinned their hopes on hydropower development
as a source of foreign revenue and driver of national development. They have asserted that
the country’s 6,000 rivers had the potential of generating 83,000 megawatts (MW) of
hydroelectricity although current installed capacity remains at less than one per cent of
that (Dixit and Gyawali 2010). In the spirit of the dominant developmentalist vision
(bikas in local parlance to refer to socio-economic development; see Pigg 1992), the gov-
ernment created the state-owned entity Nepal Electricity Authority. It gave the Authority
the monopoly over power generation, transmission and distribution but also invited dom-
estic and foreign investors into the hydropower sector. The 1992 Hydropower Policy and
Water Resources Act paved the way for private investors to get involved through the
“build, own, operate and transfer” model.
The hydropower projects proposed for various parts of the country in the 1990s pro-
voked resistance from civil society. Civil society organisations and movements ﬂourished
in the newly democratic Nepal, taking up issues in a wide range of sectors including hydro-
power (Gellner and Hachhethu 2008). They asserted the importance of conserving the
natural environment, protecting local people’s livelihoods and rights and safeguarding
the economic and social sustainability of hydropower projects. The Arun III project
became an iconic case of civil society opposition in the 1990s, especially after the resistance
caused the World Bank to withdraw its support (Dixit and Gyawali 2010). At the same
time, civil society attention to hydropower issues contributed to the emergence of a regu-
latory framework in the 1990s that was later found to overlap signiﬁcantly with the rec-
ommendations on responsible dam investment issued by the World Commission on
Dams in 2000 (Dixit and Gyawali 2010).
Since then, while civil society activism has relatively diminished in Nepal’s hydropower
sector (Rest 2012), strong regulation has remained in place to protect the interests of local
populations aﬀected by hydropower projects by securing them a share in overall beneﬁts
and granting them a right to information. Other global trends and standards (for example,
social and environmental standards incorporated as part of development aid and corpor-
ate social responsibility becoming increasingly prevalent in business operations) have also
shaped new discourses on beneﬁt sharing.2 Even though the central government assumes a
central role with regard to ownership, licensing and beneﬁt distribution, the 2001 Hydro-
power Development Policy foresees that half of all royalties are shared with the aﬀected
development region (38%) and District Development Committee (DDC) (12%). The
policy calls upon developers to employ local people in construction, provide suitable train-
ing for human resource development and implement corporate social responsibility pro-
jects. Since the Environmental Protection Regulations of 1997,3 most projects have to
conduct an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), identifying biophysical, economic,
social and cultural impacts. The project developers are required to implement impact
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mitigation measures, present the draft EIA report to the local population in a public
hearing and compensate aﬀected people for all harms and damages (Dixit and Gyawali
2010).
However, this mechanism has come under pressure recently as Nepal’s government has
tried to attract new private and foreign investment. The government introduced various
measures to overcome local resistance against hydropower projects, simplifying the
process of land acquisition, waiving the EIA requirement temporarily and limiting the
beneﬁts local people could expect to receive from new projects.
Ethnic mobilisations
Nepal has an extremely diverse population. The 2011 population census recorded a total of
125 social groups, including Hindu caste and ethnic groups (CBS 2011). The previous
census of 2001 had put the number of ethnic people at 36 per cent of the total population
(Hangen and Lawoti 2012). In 2002, the Nepal Federation for the Development of Indi-
genous Nationalities Act established the term “indigenous nationalities” (adivasi janajati)
as a legal category, listing 59 oﬃcially recognised groups.
Since 2002, ethnic mobilisations have formulated outwardly political demands (Hangen
2010). Indigenous nationalities have demanded access to economic and political resources
to redress the historical control of national politics and economy by the members of the
traditionally dominant high-caste groups. In 2006, the year of the so-called second
people’s movement following years of Maoist conﬂict, indigenous activists supported
wider demands not only for a multi-party democracy but for autonomy and self-govern-
ance of ancestral homelands.4 They inﬂuenced the drafting of the 2007 interim consti-
tution, took on an active role in the 2008 and 2013 Constituent Assembly elections and
were vociferous in raising their demands, such as for ethnicity-based federalism, albeit
not met, in the drafting of the 2015 constitution.5
NEFIN has been the dominant organisation in the indigenous nationalities movement
(Hangen and Lawoti 2012). It has successfully claimed a central role in national politics by
staging demonstrations, mass rallies and other forms of public protest. NEFIN actively
participated in the movement to curtail the powers of the King in 2006 and signed an
agreement with the interim government in 2007, which signalled an implicit recognition
of its role as representing indigenous nationalities throughout Nepal. In contrast, its eﬀorts
to increase its presence outside Kathmandu, for example by establishing district coordi-
nation councils, have been less successful (Hangen 2010). In such context of considerable
distance and disconnect, intermediaries like Shyam play an important role in linking
NEFIN’s broader activism with local issues.
The ethnic mobilisations have inﬂuenced Nepali politics and the exercise of state auth-
ority by asserting justice claims centred on indigenous nationalities’ demands for recog-
nition. In 2002, the Parliament passed a bill for the establishment of the National
Foundation for Development of Indigenous Nationalities to fund welfare programmes
for ethnic groups. Government budget planning started to make special provisions for
support to ethnic groups. The new constitution has identiﬁed the rights and speciﬁc enti-
tlements of indigenous groups as a matter of social justice. However, these successes of
ethnic mobilisations have caused a relative decline in attention to the plight of other mar-
ginalised groups, particularly the Dalits.
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ILO 169 and UNDRIP have played a critical role in ethnic mobilisations in Nepal,
giving additional weight to the emphasis on recognition over mere distributive
demands (Bhattachan 2012). Nepal was the ﬁrst country in Asia to ratify ILO 169, requir-
ing government and private sector to consult aﬀected indigenous peoples on policies, pro-
grammes and projects (Jones 2012). ILO 169 and UNDRIP provide activists with a speciﬁc
tool to implement self-governance: consultations based on the principle of Free, Prior and
Informed Consent (FPIC).6 Natural resources “have become a key battleground” (Jones
2012, 627) for self-determination. NEFIN advocates a maximalist demand that natural
resources should be considered under indigenous peoples’ collective ownership, a
demand that is rejected by virtually all major political parties (Jones 2012).
Distributional coalitions in local politics
Local politics in rural Nepal often remains dominated by “distributional coalitions”: local
powerbrokers team up to control the local population’s access to services provided by Dis-
trict and Village Development Committees (VDCs) (Pfaﬀ-Czarnecka 2008). The power-
brokers typically include government bureaucrats, politicians, businessmen, local elites,
high-caste groups and important school teachers (Sharrock 2013). Particularly from
1998 to 2017, due to absence of local elections, local government oﬃcials and politicians
were appointed by higher-level leaders.7 Lacking accountability downward, they often
collude with businessmen to control the provision of beneﬁts, channelling services, con-
tracts, jobs and so on to “one’s own people” (afno manchhe) (see Bista 1991). Challenges
arising from new political parties, NGOs or other social groupings are addressed by invit-
ing serious contenders into the coalition and including them in the distribution. The
inﬂuence of the coalitions even extends to presumably civil society institutions, such as
public concern committees (PCCs) established around development projects (Sharrock
2013).
Hydropower projects are subject to these patronage politics, since they are a signiﬁcant
source of ﬁnance, jobs, contracts, services and other opportunities (Rai 2005). They allow
local politicians to oﬀer the promise of electricity connections to their constituencies,
which have signiﬁcant leverage in a country that experienced prolonged power outages.
The jobs and contracts for the local population represent opportunities for distributional
coalitions even where beneﬁts are disbursed by private developers and not through local
government. A common vehicle for the operation of distributional coalitions outside local
government are the PCCs. Additionally, once they come online, hydropower projects
make signiﬁcant contributions to the local government budget through the royalties
shared with the DDC and transferred to VDCs.
In sum, hydropower development in Nepal witnesses the conﬂuence of hydropower
policy and politics in the narrow sense with ethnic mobilisations, shot through with
entrenched local distributive politics. Hydropower policy (emphasising distributive con-
cerns) and ethnic mobilisations (demanding recognition of indigenous nationalities’
self-determination, including control over natural resources) oﬀer competing conceptual-
isations of justice with regard to hydropower development. The procedural rights granted
to indigenous peoples under ILO 169 and UNDRIP go beyond the consultative procedures
required by Nepal’s regulation (Jones and Langford 2011). Whereas global indigenous
rights emphasise the “sincere desire to reach consensus” (Jones 2012, 627), Nepal’s
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regulation limits participation to information-sharing. The national hydropower policies
emphasising royalty sharing and local employment, for example, coupled with local
desires to development, also act as a classic means of co-opting local villagers to develop-
ment projects. These provisions become cultural lenses through which the villagers inter-
pret their situations (Merry and Levitt 2017). FPIC becomes a secondary frame of
reference while issues of beneﬁt-sharing become the priority (Lord 2016). Thus, hydro-
electric actors’ and indigenous activists’ ideas about socially just hydropower development
are far apart.
The study site: a river valley in western Nepal
The Bargachhi VDC is located in western Nepal along a river that a prominent Nepali
development planner referred to as a “golden egg”: because it is snow-fed it provides a
fairly reliable ﬂow throughout the year, making it ideal for hydroelectric run-of-the-
river projects. In the VDC, six villages are directly aﬀected by the project. They include
179 households, of which 65 per cent belong to indigenous groups (Gurung, Ghale,
Tamang and Newar), 18 per cent to high-caste groups and 17 per cent to Dalits.
Smallholder agriculture is the main source of subsistence and cash income for the vil-
lagers. In our survey, nearly two thirds of the sample households speciﬁed cultivation and
livestock husbandry as their main source of food and income. Yet, just one half of all
households had their own ﬁelds while one out of six households worked as sharecroppers
on land owned by others. Consequently, only one out of 20 households reported selling
agricultural produce, the rest consumed all produce at home. Mirroring the situation
across Nepal, Dalit households found themselves at the lower end of the distribution,
the average households possessing signiﬁcantly less land. Living standards were low;
some villagers barely met their own subsistence requirements. Half of all households
lived in houses with brick walls and corrugated iron or tile roofs. Nearly half of all house-
holds reported that their annual cash income remained below 50,000 Nepalese Rupees
(NPR), whereas a quarter declared a cash income above NPR 100,000 (1 USD =NPR
100). Five out of six Dalit households had an annual cash income less than NPR 50,000
and lived in houses made from thatch or mud.
Construction of the hydropower project began in 2012, under a license for installed
capacity of 50 MW and a period of 35 years. The run-of-the-river project does not
require the building of a massive reservoir but channels the river ﬂow into a ﬁve kilo-
metre-long tunnel through the mountainside. The project is a joint venture between a
foreign and Nepali partner, which we refer to as “the company”. The company agreed
to invest an estimated NPR 10 billion in the project under Nepal’s “build, own, operate,
and transfer” policy. It signed a power purchase agreement with the Nepal Electricity
Authority and started generation in 2017.
The construction works aﬀected villagers, although impacts were relatively small in
comparison with those caused by hydropower projects involving dam construction (for
example, Rai 2005). The project did not require much land, minimising the need for per-
manent resettlement and the loss of agricultural land. It might not even compete with local
agriculture for water, since villagers were mostly using secondary streams for irrigation.
However, they reported other impacts of construction, as anticipated in the project’s
EIA prepared in 2005: heavy dust, cracks in structures due to tunnel-related detonations
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and decreased drinking water. In all, 15 households had to be relocated temporarily, and
one permanently.
Everyday negotiations over hydropower
Once the construction started, villagers engaged the hydropower company actively.
Many acknowledged the practical beneﬁts the project brought to them, in particular
the construction of a new bridge and road improvements. Some professed pride in
living next to the country’s ﬁrst road tunnel, which the company had to blast
through the mountainside for their vehicles. Since the project signiﬁed socio-economic
development – bikas – to them, opposition to the project in its entirety was unconcei-
vable. Nevertheless, all villagers we talked to voiced certain demands with regard to the
hydropower project: they expected the company to undertake remedial actions against
avoidable losses, pay compensation for unavoidable losses and provide further beneﬁts
to the local population.
The dust generated by the company vehicles was the problem that annoyed villagers
most. Villagers were concerned that the dust would damage their health and resented
its eﬀects on shops, houses and agricultural ﬁelds along the road. They requested the
company to sprinkle the road on a regular basis, which the company usually complied
with by sending water trucks down the road. When the company forgot to do so, or
when the road got too muddy because of too much sprinkling, villagers spoke directly
to the truck drivers. In a few instances, when company drivers did not follow their
requests, villagers simply blocked the road for a few hours until the company sent the
next water truck, or the road dried up.
The second-most important concern to villagers were the cracks that they saw develop
in some of their houses due to the explosions set oﬀ by the company. As soon as villagers
noticed new cracks in their houses, they reported them to the company. Company staﬀ
sent to assess the damage would take photos for storage in a project database. The
photos served as evidence for the company staﬀ, a technician of the Environmental Man-
agement Unit, a policeman and the District Technical Oﬃcer to decide about the validity
of the report and signiﬁcance of damage. If approved, the company oﬀered villagers com-
pensation for the damage, which people appreciated in principle despite complaints that
the amount was too low.
The assertion of claims and payment of compensation was never a clear and straight-
forward process, as illustrated by four households that had to vacate their houses for the
heaviest construction period. On the one hand, the aﬀected villagers did not tire of stres-
sing and inﬂating the costs and losses imposed by the temporary relocation. As an elderly
lady told us, after spending part of the compensation payment to build a temporary shed,
her household would spend the remainder “on purchasing vegetables because we don’t
have a kitchen garden here.” At the same time, she noted that “we have deposited the
remaining amount in a bank”. On the other hand, company oﬃcials complained in
unison that “people are never satisﬁed” and “demands are always exaggerated”, although
the compensation was very good. “If Nepalese would run the project”, an environmental
oﬃcer pointed out, “the compensation amount would not be so high”. Yet, the company
had to give in to villagers’ demands, in part because it was under pressure to ﬁnish in three
years and because it could not aﬀord to generate local hostility, since it was to stay in
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operation for the next 35 years. In the end, company and villagers always met somewhere
between their initial positions.
Another area of heavy negotiations between villagers and the company was labour hire.
Villagers generally welcomed the generation of new jobs through the construction. Some
400–500 people from Bargachhi and its vicinity found employment with the hydropower
project, close to 200 foreign workers and 200–300 workers from other areas of Nepal.
However, villagers were also deeply suspicious whether the company had done enough
to generate local jobs. Despite requirements under Nepali regulations and the EIA to
give preference to local workers, many villagers were convinced that the company pre-
ferred to hire workers from elsewhere in Nepal, and neglected to provide training for
local labour. A man explained to us that he was not satisﬁed with the low pay and
thought “it would be better to go to Gulf countries for employment”.
In stark contrast to the general dissatisfaction with labour hire, villagers were positive
about the neighbourhood support programme, even though the company started it only in
2014. The agreement was that Bargachhi would receive more than half of the support
because it was the most aﬀected VDC. The company committed a total of NPR 40
million for three years and declared that in line with the EIA, the budget was available
to support local schools, health posts and whatever would be deemed as critical for
socio-economic development.8 An immediate use of some of the funds was the construc-
tion of a water tap in a village where construction activities had aﬀected a drinking water
source, according to villagers.
Together with the neighbourhood support programme the company established a PCC
in early 2014. According to the company’s public relations oﬃcer (who is from a local
Gurung indigenous community), the PCC’s main task was to “mediate between people
and the project” and “facilitate smooth project operations”. Once the PCC was set up
and registered as an NGO, the company expected all dealings with villagers to run
through it. It had the mandate to allocate funds in the neighbourhood support programme
and to recruit workers for the company. The PCC’s 53 members are diverse, including
Dalit, women and people from various ethnic groups, as its Chairman Ram pointed
out. An inﬂuential school teacher and a powerful local party leader, Ram belonged to a
major indigenous group in Bargachhi. More importantly, as the company’s public
relations oﬃcer noted, “the PCC was formed through multiparty consensus”, including
all ﬁve major parties active in Bargachhi.
Two months after the PCC’s establishment, villagers’ suspicions about its nature and
actions ran high. Several people told us that many villagers did not feel represented by
it, which they saw as responding to company concerns only. A Dalit lady identiﬁed the
Committee narrowly with its Chairman Ram and said that Ram only implemented
what the company told him to, and did not listen to villagers’ concerns. She complained
that the concerns of Dalits in particular are ignored by others, mainly because they are
considered a diﬀerent group and also “because they live in the village periphery”. Many
villagers had noted that PCC members hired local workers through their personal and
party networks, and that the members often preferred hiring workers from other areas
since they could charge them a commission.
Thus, villagers engaged in intense negotiations with the company. They demanded
remedial action for avoidable harms, compensation for unavoidable losses, and a share
in project beneﬁts. The villagers’ assertiveness led an NGO activist to comment “there
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is a perception that in hydro-projects people can make any demands”. At the same time,
people paid surprisingly little attention to the project’s wider environmental, social and
cultural impacts, due to concerns with immediate impacts people experienced in their
daily lives, such as dust. Nor did villagers’ demands extend to future revenue-sharing or
the payment of royalties for the use of sand and other natural resources, stipulated by
Nepal’s regulation as major means for socially just hydropower development.9 Villagers
did not know of these regulatory stipulations because there was no one who told them,
the company did not make the EIA report public and the required visits by Ministry of
Environment inspectors never happened.
During these negotiations, villagers generally came to accept the parameters set by the
company for negotiations over justice, just as they assented to the view that the hydro-
power project brought bikas to their valley. As a woman explained, “the people are not
in favour of closing the project but in favour of getting the compensation”. Similarly,
an environmental oﬃcer commented that any obstructive activities undertaken by villa-
gers, such as temporary road blockages, were “a way of demanding” – and not an indi-
cation of opposition to the project or the company. “People have the idea that if a
strike is done, they can get compensation”. Next to jobs, compensation became the cur-
rency by which villagers and the company operationalised and measured a notion of
justice squarely centred on distributive matters. This implicit consensus found illustration
in villagers’ reactions to the death of a child who died crossing a creek that had been
diverted by the project: they demanded compensation for the parents and the construction
of a pedestrian bridge.
Brokering justice in a hydropower project
These everyday negotiations set the scene for Shyam’s eﬀorts to relate the demands of
indigenous activists to villagers who were mostly indigenous peoples themselves. Stres-
sing the signiﬁcance of ILO 169 and UNDRIP, Shyam demanded villagers’ collective
consultation following the principle of FPIC, thereby forwarding NEFIN’s recognition
agenda that was quite diﬀerent from villagers’ primary concern with compensation.
At the same time, Shyam’s demand for the application of FPIC was also justiﬁable
under Nepal’s EIA regulations. Those required a public hearing on the EIA report
and active solicitation of villagers’ feedback. In contrast, when the Nepali company con-
ducting the EIA organised a public hearing in Bargachhi in June 2005, which was
attended by some 200 people, it distributed the report’s executive summary only, and
there was no way that villagers could grasp the signiﬁcance of the proposed project
within a couple of hours. Nor were they asked to declare their consent to the proposed
project.
Shyam’s ﬁrst action was to report the violation of the FPIC principle to Nepal’s Human
Rights Commission. He ﬁled a complaint with the Commission as a representative of the
Gurung and Tamang ethnic groups. The form stated that the project was “carrying on
infrastructural construction […] without informing local people and thereby violated
the right to FPIC of the local Gurung and Tamang indigenous communities”. Shyam
also reported that the project aﬀected indigenous peoples’ cultural rights because it
“started construction works in the cremation area”. In addition, Shyam notiﬁed inter-
national indigenous rights activists in Asia and Africa about the case.
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Shyam was aware of the higher stakes involved in his demands. On the one hand, the
demand for FPIC applied not only to the speciﬁc hydropower project but had wider rel-
evance to hydropower development and political representation in the district. Noting that
the district “has been extraordinary in licensing hydropower”, Sham alluded to the various
projects being implemented or planned; these projects raised important issues during their
construction and heralded the transfer of signiﬁcant budgetary resources to the DDC in
the form of royalties.10 On the other hand, Shyam denied that the established political
parties had any legitimacy in representing indigenous peoples because “political parties
represent the state”, whereas “we in NEFIN represent indigenous peoples”.
Shyam’s challenge
Shyam encountered signiﬁcant challenges in his campaign for FPIC. A critical challenge
was personal: how Shyam saw himself, and how he liked to be seen. Shyam had been a
member of NEFIN for many years and had played a critical role in establishing its coordi-
nation council in the district. He was known as an outspoken advocate for indigenous
peoples’ rights and had been active in training other NEFIN staﬀ beyond the district.
Shyam was motivated to ﬁnd new ﬁelds in which to exercise leadership, and identiﬁed
the hydropower project and hydropower more generally as such. As a self-promoting
civil society representative, he had been trying to insert NEFIN into any conﬂicts
between the project-aﬀected communities and the company. He had voiced the demand
to initiate FPIC consultations already two years ago, given two training sessions on
FPIC, ILO 169 and UNDRIP and sent a written request to the company a year ago.
Shyam felt deeply frustrated that the company “did not listen to this”.
Other challenges encountered by Shyam were more of a political nature. He was both
the chairman of the NEFIN district council and an active participant in district party poli-
tics. He was nearing the end of his term as NEFIN chairman, and witnessed attempts by
other members to undermine his leadership. In district politics, he had recently joined the
newly formed Federal Socialist Party, which had the recognition of indigenous rights on its
agenda. His new party competed directly for the left voter base with the established United
Marxists and Leninists party, which already claimed to represent indigenous peoples’
interests with regard to hydropower and had some inﬂuence on the national NEFIN lea-
dership. Shyam’s bid for a seat in the Constituent Assembly elections was unsuccessful,
impacting negatively on his standing in district party politics. All these events left
Shyam in a precarious position both within NEFIN and district politics.
In addition, Shyam knew that he would encounter serious opposition from most
local leaders in Bargachhi. The project had intelligently enrolled many local party
leaders in the PCC, in line with the entrenched distributional coalitions common in
rural Nepal. The leaders of the established political party that competed with his
new party controlled the PCC through Ram, the inﬂuential school teacher and party
member living in Bargachhi. As one member commented, “whatever the leader says,
that will happen”. Another member said that in Committee meetings, “the voice of
[ordinary] PCC members [was] not heard”. Another member voiced her suspicion
that she was invited to join the 13-member secretariat only because the regulations
required female representation. Although the PCC included members of various
ethnic groups, NEFIN was not invited to send a representative. In Shyam’s view, the
CJDS / LA REVUE 11
PCC was “a product of biased divisions between political parties, and not really repre-
senting the aﬀected population”.
In addition, Shyam was convinced that the project was “clever enough to buy the
leaders” by allowing them to derive personal beneﬁts from their involvement. Several
PCC members seized the opportunity to inﬂuence labour recruitment for their own pol-
itical beneﬁts. Ram managed to hire out some 10–15 dozers, vehicles and tractors to the
company, although he did not own any of them. As Shyam found out, Ram sourced the
vehicles from their owners and levied a surcharge of 50 per cent on the rental fees. Ram
also rented part of his land for the establishment of a military post, charging the company
a fee that was more than double the amount paid to another villager and that far exceeded
the typical rental price for local agricultural land.
Thus, Shyam understood well that it would be hard to generate local support for his
demand. He reacted by pointing out that “we don’t want to stop the project” but just
get the project to respect villagers’ rights. He also made it clear that his demand would
not only beneﬁt indigenous peoples but take account of “local people”. Furthermore, he
extended his demand for FPIC to address the villagers’ distributive concerns by calling
for “direct payments to local people”.
Shyam responded to the situation by adapting NEFIN’s self-determination agenda so
that it incorporated villagers’ distributive demands. He also started to engage in speciﬁc
activities to support villagers’ demands and, in turn, to enrol them in his campaign, as
we show in the following.
The labour strike
Shyam made common cause with a labour union leader who mobilised company workers
for a strike against their employment conditions. Shyam expressed NEFIN’s support for
the strikers’ grievances, added NEFIN’s demands for FPIC and adherence to ILO 169 to
the list of demands and provided practical support to the strike organisation. On 24 Feb-
ruary 2014, virtually all local workers refused to work further until the company met their
requests. They gathered at the project site together with many other villagers and sent a
delegation to the district centre to meet the DDC. The strike brought all construction
to a halt and caused the company to send home the workers it had hired from other
parts of Nepal. In the following nine days, local workers and other villagers continued
to hold meetings in the villages. The strike was eventually resolved through mediation
of district-level government oﬃcials, politicians and the PCC when the company promised
a small salary increase and improved beneﬁts.
When we talked to some of the key players barely a month later, they agreed that
workers, villagers, labour union and NEFIN had made common cause for the strike.
However, their accounts of the strike’s aims and how it unfolded varied widely. To
Shyam, NEFIN was the main organiser of the mass gathering on the ﬁrst day, which
included 1,000 participants: “all the workers, local people, indigenous people and
mothers’ groups”. Shyam emphasised the extension of the strike to the district centre,
and that he had caused Nepal’s Human Rights Commission to send representatives to
the construction site and meet with the company and aﬀected villagers.
Other accounts agreed that the strike had involved workers and many other villagers,
and that the demands included improved labour conditions and the consultation of
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aﬀected people. However, they attributed a much smaller role to NEFIN and indigenous
activists’ demands than claimed by Shyam, and challenged his account of a big rally in the
district centre. The delegation sent to meet the DDC was a small one, as most strikers
stayed in Bargachhi. This was not a minor detail because it reﬂected the relative signiﬁ-
cance of the labour demands (directed at the company in Bargachhi) and the consultation
demand (addressed to the DDC).
The events and their recollection illustrate Shyam’s precarious position between
NEFIN’s agenda and local politics. Shyam tried hard to connect NEFIN’s key demand
for the consultation of aﬀected indigenous peoples with villagers’ claims. However,
when the delegation sent from Bargachhi met the DDC, Shyam was not invited to the
table. Similarly, Shyam was dissatisﬁed with the resolution of the strike since it met
none of his demands. “The outcome was not just”, he concluded. It was not just within
the justice agenda promoted by NEFIN, that is, the focus on indigenous peoples’ recog-
nition and the right to FPIC. In contrast, local political leaders, some of whom were
also in the PCC, had not supported the strikers’ cause but instead pressured the
workers to accept the settlement. As a result, the company had to make only minor con-
cessions because it “bought the loyalty of some local leaders” and because it succeeded in
dividing the labour union and NEFIN.
Resettlement
Another issue that came to Shyam’s attention was the standoﬀ between the company
and the village residents on resettlement. The EIA had deemed it necessary to relocate
some of the village households temporarily to avoid harm from the construction works.
It had classiﬁed the 24 village households into three categories according to their
exposure to potential harms, proposing that the 11 considered at high risk would be
relocated for 15 months against compensation of NPR 500,000 each. The other 13
households would not have to move and receive compensation of NPR 10,000–
100,000. The villagers were deeply dissatisﬁed with the proposal and countered with
the demand that every household in the village should receive compensation of NPR
4,500,000.
Shyam saw this standoﬀ as an opportunity for NEFIN to support villagers and simul-
taneously establish NEFIN as a player in the negotiations between villagers and the
company. Shyam mentioned the dispute in the report to the Human Rights Commission,
depicting villagers’ demands as a request by ethnic Gurung to “guarantee adherence to
international law on human rights including ILO-169”. He also included the demand
for equal and fair compensation in the agenda of the labour strike. He stressed villagers’
demand for equal compensation to all, de-emphasising the company’s focus on the
material impacts of relocation, and instead arguing that villagers were “fearful that their
culture will be disrupted because of the relocation”.
The ﬁrst few months of 2014 witnessed intense bargaining over the terms of relocation
between the villagers and company. The company’s response to villagers’ request for col-
lective compensation was very minor increases in the compensation amounts, which
infuriated villagers. They in turn wrote to the company demanding payment of NPR
1,846,000 and the guarantee of employment for two people per household. To lend
force to their demand, villagers started to block the construction works near the
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planned tunnel. They continued the blockade for six days, engaging in various displays
such as banging plates together or holding up placards.
The villagers and the company eventually came to an agreement regarding the reloca-
tion. Ram and other leaders from the PCC played an important mediating role. The
company raised the compensation amounts for all households. The households to be relo-
cated were promised NPR 1,000,000, and other households were to receive between NPR
100,000 and NPR 250,000. In addition, Ram invited two people from the village to join the
PCC, one as member of the Secretariat, the other – female – as a regular member. The
company did not make any concession on employment, except the general promise to
give priority to skilled workers from the village when hiring.
The agreement eﬀectively divided the villagers among each other. The 11 households
that received NPR 1,000,000 appeared pleased in our conversations with them but
clearly did not want to reveal that in light of other villagers’ frustrations over the agree-
ment. They emphasised that they had to accept the settlement, even though it was not
good for them, because otherwise they were in danger of not getting any compensation
at all. The other households remained concerned that they may suﬀer from the detona-
tions. Pointing out that some households were relocated whereas their neighbours were
not, a Dalit woman asked how it was possible that “two households so close to each
other [fell] under two diﬀerent categories”.
The labour strike and the resettlement dispute reveal several problems limiting Shyam’s
ability to enrol villagers in his campaign. One was his relatively precarious personal stand-
ing and the marginal position of his organisation, NEFIN, in district politics; another was
the company’s successful recruitment of local leaders into a distributional coalition, as
practiced elsewhere in Nepal (Rai 2005; Sharrock 2013). The NEFIN agenda itself
restricted the discursive repertoire available to Shyam: its focus on indigenous self-deter-
mination and on FPIC limited the appeal of the NEFIN campaign to villagers, with their
interest in distributive issues. Although Shyam adapted the NEFIN agenda to villagers’
demands, the distributive conception of justice speciﬁed in Nepal’s regulations and
implemented by the company remained more attractive to both villagers and leaders.
Conclusion: brokering justice
Our insights highlight the brokerage operating at the intersection between diﬀerent
notions of justice in speciﬁc political contexts. The conceptions speciﬁed in global
norms, enshrined in national policy and held by villagers are likely to diﬀer from each
other. In our study site, the critical diﬀerence was between NEFIN’s recognition
demands in congruence with global indigenous rights and the distributive notions estab-
lished in villagers’ everyday negotiations with the company in line with Nepali hydro-
power policy. In other socio-environmental struggles in Nepal or worldwide, diﬀerences
may take other forms, yet asserted notions of justice are more likely to be plural than con-
verge on a single meaning. The presence of multiple notions, therefore, opens up and sim-
ultaneously constrains the political grounds for brokerage. Brokerage helps to constitute
certain notions of justice as relevant, dominant or even hegemonic by relating them to
speciﬁc socio-environmental struggles and aligning involved actors. Yet it also helps to
keep notions of justice subject to ongoing political contestation and re-constitution,
including those originating from global norms.
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In our account, we have highlighted the signiﬁcance of brokerage and practices of bro-
kering justice, which is diﬀerent from speaking of “brokers of justice”. Brokerage does
operate through the practices of particular intermediaries who assert, adapt and
subvert plural notions of justice. Nevertheless, these intermediaries are not simply
“brokers” since brokerage is typically only part of what they do (Mosse and Lewis
2006). In our case, Shyam also participates in party politics, personally cares about indi-
genous peoples’ rights and engages in other activities relevant to his campaign. The loss of
standing in district party politics that he suﬀered after losing the elections also aﬀected his
eﬀorts with regard to the hydropower project. Moreover, justice is only one ﬁeld of
brokerage, which concurrently forges relationships and generates shared framings in
other ﬁelds. Shyam’s eﬀorts to convince villagers were not only about how justice
should be deﬁned and realised with regard to the hydropower project, but also involve
other political manoeuvres, such as stories about local leaders’ corrupt dealings, claims
about cultural signiﬁcance, practical organisational support and the use of his personal
political networks.
This embeddedness of justice politics in wider political dynamics raises the question of
how notions of justice enable and conﬁne practices of brokerage by aﬀecting the positions
of involved intermediaries. We suggest that intermediaries derive advantages from their
linkages to multiple notions of justice for the discursive and material resources associated
with them. NEFIN’s agenda provides Shyam with a powerful justiﬁcatory framing and
access to mobilisational resources. In other instances, references to justice have been
found to bolster claims for state support, the state remaining the key guarantor of
rights and most critical source of ﬁnance (Wolford 2003). Appeals to justice aﬀord privi-
leged access to external support and knowledge through contacts to activists in other
locations, countries or at the global level (Lindell 2009). Additionally, notions of justice
aﬀord the intermediaries means to make sense of messy social realities and to deﬁne as
what kind of person they want to be recognised (Mosse 2005).
At the same time, brokering justice is also a source of vulnerability to intermediaries. As
Shyam’s eﬀorts demonstrate vividly, intermediaries have to persuade people with grie-
vances to accept certain notions of justice and need to convince states, companies,
donors and other actors to supply ﬁnancial and political support in response to such
demands. Notions enshrined in global norms, invoked by higher-level mobilisations or
imported from other places may not ﬁt the notions, historical experiences and cognitive
frameworks of people involved in particular socio-environmental struggles (Wolford
2003; Upton 2014; Merry 2006b). Worse, hegemonic notions of justice may limit the
repertoires of ideas and practices available to intermediaries in particular contexts, as
highlighted by our case.
Brokerage sheds new light on the importance of global norms in providing discur-
sive support to marginalised people and giving them access to material support. Global
conceptualisations of justice may eﬀectively bolster site-speciﬁc struggles, as has been
observed with anti-dam protests in Thailand and Mozambique (Sneddon and Fox
2008). Global norms may even do so in cases where their justice conceptions do not
ﬁt neatly with the notions asserted in site-speciﬁc demands, as mobilisations for
justice have successfully accommodated discrepancies (Upton 2014). Conversely, in
particular contexts, global norms may work to restrict the discursive options available
to marginalised people in speciﬁc socio-environmental struggles. In other cases,
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multiple vernacularisations can result in competing understandings of rights and
justice, which may diﬀer greatly from their intended transnational meanings and
values (Goldstein 2015). Global ideas about justice may even displace alternative
visions of social justice due to “the vastly unequal distribution of power and resources
that channels how ideas develop in global settings and are picked up or rejected in local
places” (Merry 2006a, 4).
Our ﬁndings highlight some of the vexing issues encountered in indigenous peoples’
mobilisations and the implementation of global indigenous rights. On the one hand,
the focus on global and national mobilisations and internal power relations may limit
their responsiveness to indigenous peoples’ speciﬁc demands in particular settings, such
as the distributive demands observed in our study. On the other, the emphasis on indigen-
ous peoples may work to discriminate against other marginalised groups, such as the
Dalits in our study. The relative success of indigenous peoples’ global advocacy, therefore,
challenges activists to “indigenise” their demands for justice, as Shyam has attempted in
Bargachhi. If indigenous rights activists fail to do this, their mobilisations may fail to
gain traction or may even become a source of injustice.
Notes
1. Personal and place names in this article are pseudonyms, to protect the anonymity of our
informants.
2. Policy provisions and practices for hydropower project beneﬁt sharing in Nepal include: a
royalty mechanism, local share oﬀers, support for local livelihoods (such as employment
and training), investment in community development and local infrastructure, and allocated
budget for environmental enhancement activities (Shrestha et al. 2016; Lord 2016).
3. Available at: http://mowss.gov.np/assets/uploads/ﬁles/Environment_Protection_Rules.pdf
4. After years of conﬂicts arising from bad governance, underdevelopment, widening inequality
and discrimination, Nepal has undergone a number of political changes since 2006. These
include: the peace agreement between the Maoists and the government (2006); declaration
of a republic following the end of the Nepalese monarchy (2008); Constituent Assembly
elections (2008 and 2013); promulgation of the new constitution by the Constituent Assem-
bly (2015); and local, state and national elections under a federal governance set-up (2017
and 2018).
5. The consensus today among major political actors is that Nepal cannot become a modern
nation-state without acknowledging and addressing layers of exclusionary practices based
on class, caste, ethnicity, region and gender. These sentiments are broadly documented in
Nepal’s 2015 constitution (see, for example, Article 18).
6. See Articles 7.1 and 7.3 of ILO Convention 169 (1989) and Articles 1–4 and 25–30 of
UNDRIP (2007). ILO 169 is legally binding, whereas UNDRIP is not.
7. Local elections were held in Nepal in 2017 after a gap of almost 20 years. These were the ﬁrst
to be held after the promulgation of 2015 constitution.
8. With this, the company met the regulatory requirement that hydropower developers spend
one per cent of the construction budget on the provision of compensation and beneﬁts to the
local population.
9. On the latter, the company had already agreed with the DDC on the payment of NPR 2.2
million, of which 35 per cent would have to be transferred to Bargachhi VDC according
to Nepali law.
10. Just for this one project, we estimate that the royalties expected by the DDC are signiﬁcant,
contributing an additional 5 per cent to the district budget in the ﬁrst 15 years and a
staggering 75 per cent thereafter.
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